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Abstract
Despite the range of subjects tackled by affective and emotional geographers, laughter has received
relatively little attention. Those who do discuss laughter, do so for the most part in terms of the
‘‘humorous’’ moments that precede it. This paper proposes a distinctly different approach: shifting
focus away from humour to foreground laughter as an analytical category. Through this, I argue that
we can understand laughter as a phenomenon in its own right, without reducing it to humorous
intentionality (even when there is humour present). This allows further analytical precision within
discussions of laughter particularly around the ways in which it affects bodies and spaces. The paper
first discusses laughter as more-than-representational; as having transpersonal and atmospheric
spatialities, capable of affecting and being affected beyond its relationship with humour. The refrain
is then deployed as a conceptual means through which we can grasp laughter’s indeterminate
capacities to generate spaces, atmospheres and subjectivities. Drawing on insights from three
months of ethnographic research spent working in nursing care homes, I illustrate these
conceptions of laughter in terms of the ways it can enact, disrupt, and reconfigure different
relationships between bodies and space. This case study thus prompts discussion of the ethical
implications of thinking laughter in this manner, particularly the need to develop an ethos for
laughter that remains open to its potential for multiple (and often unexpected) outcomes.
Keywords
Laughter, refrains, atmospheres, ethics, nonrepresentational theories, ethnography, nursing care
homes
Shared laughter, which is often about returning laughter with laughter, involves sharing a
direction, or following a line. The repetition of such gestures makes a point, as a point that
creates its impressions. (Ahmed, 2006: 556)
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Introduction
Parvulescu (2010) argues that most theories of laughter are not concerned with laughter at
all. Instead they position it as the response to something else – humour, jokes, the ridiculous
or the grotesque – and it is this that they end up theorising. In geographic work, laughter has
mostly remained a ﬂeeting referent, although there is a growing body of work with laughter
much closer to its core (e.g. Bissell et al., 2012; Brigstocke, 2014; Dittmer, 2013; Emmerson,
2016; Hynes and Sharpe, 2010; Macpherson, 2008; Ridanpa¨a¨, 2014; Sharpe and Hynes,
2016). This work however, for the most part, again seems to seek out the comic and the
humorous, rather than laughter itself.
This paper therefore proposes a distinctly diﬀerent approach to thinking about laughter:
shifting focus away from humour and instead foregrounding laughter as an analytical
category. Through this laughter can be attended to as phenomenon in its own right –
without reducing it to humour (even when humour is present). This is not to downgrade
humour, but rather to recognise humour and laughter as diﬀerent phenomena, and thus to
establish further analytical precision within discussions of laughter itself. In contrast to many
accounts, laughter is therefore positioned as exceeding the intentionality of humour and of
laughers themselves (Hughes, 2016; Nancy, 1993), and therefore as capable of creating
trajectories of its own accord. The paper demonstrates this empirically, through attending
to laughter in spaces of care, drawing on three months of ethnographic research working
within nursing care homes. Reﬂecting on these empirical elements thus leads me to argue for a
new approach to the ethics of laughter; one that avoids universal arguments, and instead
remains open to laughter’s potential to enact multiple (and often unexpected) outcomes.
I thus start by positioning laughter as transpersonal, and as having atmospheric
spatialities, capable of aﬀecting and being aﬀected beyond its relationship with humour.
The refrain is then deployed as a valuable means through which we can grasp laughter’s
(indeterminate) capacities to generate spaces, atmospheres and subjectivities. Empirically the
paper explores laughter within nursing care homes, highlighting its capacities to enact,
disrupt, and reconﬁgure relationships between bodies and space in ways that are not
reducible to humour. The discussion considers the ethical implications of thinking about
laughter in this manner, arguing for an ethos that is less rigid in what constitutes good or bad
encounters. I conclude by reiterating my urge to adopt more precision when thinking about
laughter and suggesting the signiﬁcance of this diﬀerent approach.
#choosehappiness
A man boards a train heading for Boechout. He stands, leaning against a support railing,
removing an iPad from his bag and unfolding the cover. The train is full of subdued, silent
passengers, rocking back and forth as the train jostles along the tracks. The bald man,
headphones in his ears, stares at the screen of his iPad, starting to chuckle quietly. His
chuckles give way to a much louder laugh, causing his head to rise and neck elongate.
The other passengers take note, glancing at him with inquisitive looks. A couple smirk,
looking at each other and then back to the man. His laugh intensiﬁes. As it grows louder,
more people begin to look, some turning around in their seats. The passengers smile with
what looks like a mixture of nervousness and joy. A small giggle erupts from one passenger,
her shoulders shaking as she tries to hold it in. Ever more, passengers start to laugh openly,
their bodies jostling in line with the man, other passengers, and the movements of the train.
Before long the train carriage is full of people laughing, some harder than others. The
passengers look at each other, sharing in the bald man’s laughter at . . .well whatever he is
laughing at. Suddenly, three passengers unzip hoodies to reveal Coca-Cola branded T-shirts
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and they start moving down the train, handing out cans of soda and cards with a smiling face
on them. Our image cuts to a red background with the slogan ‘‘Happiness starts with a
smile’’ followed by the universally familiar Coca-Cola branding with ‘‘#choosehappiness’’
below it.1
More-than-representational laughter
The advert described above may be slightly sinister, both in its staged nature, and the implied
connection between choosing Coca-cola and choosing happiness. Yet it acts as a reminder
that laughter can do things that are somewhat separate to its causes. Parvulescu (2010) argues
that scholarship around laughter remains too focused on humour; overwhelmingly analysed
through three causal theories – superiority, incongruity and release/relief theory – which
position the body, as an individual subject or object, in relation to laughter (e.g. Billig, 2005;
Critchley, 2002). Parvulescu (2010) thus advocates a ‘‘(re)turn to laughter’’, through which
laughter’s eﬀects, movements, and meanings can be understood, without being reduced to a
representation of the preceding humorous event.
There has been a small but signiﬁcant engagement with humour that has to some extent
moved away from the theories laid out above, instead considering its more-than-
representational elements. This work is characterised by attempts to understand the
(molecular) movements that humour can generate, the capacities that this aﬀords to
diﬀerent bodies, and thus the complex ways in which power is mobilised by it at various
scales (e.g. Bissell et al., 2012; Brigstocke, 2014; Dittmer, 2013; Sharpe et al., 2014). Sharpe
et al. (2014), for instance, discuss the comedy performances of Stewart Lee, arguing that
their aesthetics enable audiences to generate new ‘‘aﬀective habits’’ through which prejudices
might be altered and made less certain. Elsewhere, Hynes and Sharpe (2010) note that
humour aﬃrms already existing desires and the social constructions through which they
are made into moral judgements. Brigstocke (2014: 85) similarly suggests humour as
oﬀering an ‘‘alternative cultural vehicle for making the limits of socio-biological life
visible and felt at the aﬀective registers of experience’’. Humour is thus seen as a means
of accessing power geometries to enforce control onto bodies in subtle ways (Bissell et al.,
2012), or to resist these structures through modes of creative interruption (Brigstocke, 2014;
Sharpe et al., 2014), or creating ‘‘sensuous solidarities’’ (Routledge, 2012).
While these nonrepresentational discussions of humour do provide a more nuanced
interpretation of its workings and power structures than traditional humour theories, they
still fall under the category of scholarship that Parvulescu (2010) critiques – namely analytic
focus on humour rather than laughter. That is not to say that laughter is completely absent in
this work. Laughter is noted to be aﬃrmative (Hynes and Sharpe, 2010); linked to violence
(Brigstocke, 2014); inseparable from fear (Brown and Penttinen, 2013); and a unique form of
communication (Billig, 2005). My contention, however, is that in most cases a form of lexical
slippage occurs whereby laughter and humour become synonymous, and thus discussions of
‘‘laughter’’ almost always equate to a discussion of humour. Hynes and Sharpe’s (2010) ‘‘Yea-
saying Laughter’’ for instance, is premised on a discussion of laughter but seems to merge
‘‘laughter’’ and ‘‘humour’’ without necessarily distinguishing between the two (see also
Brigstocke, 2014; Douglas, 2015 for a similar impasse).
The problem arises therefore as to how we might think of laughter without reducing it to
humour. Bataille argues that we cannot know the causes of laughter, because laughter
emerges from the ‘‘unknowable’’ itself, and therefore trying to understand it through
humour transforms it into something diﬀerent (Bataille and Michelson, 1986). Nancy
(1993) subsequently shifts the problem: questioning laughter’s presence and how it comes
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to be known. Laughter, he argues, emerges as ‘‘aﬀection’’ rather than representation, and
occurs always ‘‘in-between’’ – in-between aesthetics, desires, and modes of subjectivity.2 Also
inﬂuenced by Bataille, Macpherson (2008) oﬀers a distinction: humour as involving the
intellect, with laughter diﬀering in that it is a muscular phenomenon, not always
controlled or regulated by the subject. Dittmer (2013: 499) therefore ‘‘crudely’’ maps
humour onto ‘‘the discursive’’ and laughter onto the ‘‘aﬀective’’. Ultimately Dittmer
argues that humour and laughter cannot be teased apart, yet Macpherson (2008) notes
that there are times when laughter has no clear link to humour: when we laugh and don’t
know why. In other words, as Hughes (2016) suggests, laughter itself is not reducible the
intentionality of a pre-existing (humorous) subject, but rather produces the subject through
its occurrence (see also Sharpe et al., 2014).
We might therefore consider laughter as transpersonal, rather than the property of
individual subjective bodies (Ahmed, 2004). The transpersonal properties of laughter are
perhaps more obvious than with some emotions. On the one hand, laughter is ﬁrmly situated
in the materiality of the body. Particular sites within the body move to produce laughter –
the diaphragm rhythmically contracts, the neck elongates, and the mouth opens (Parvulescu,
2010) – and are moved because of it – bellies, breasts, arms, legs, and heads shake with
laughter (Bakhtin, 1984; Mbembe, 2001). On the other hand, these material movements are
excessive – overﬂowing the bounds of the body as they project sound outwards, but also
exceeding representation through generating aﬀective intra/inter-actions within and between
diﬀerent bodies (Colls, 2007).
This idea of laughter as transpersonal can be seen within Macpherson’s (2008) discussion
of laughter’s contagious capacities. She argues that laughter itself can provoke laughter in
others but also that people who are already laughing may ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to stop – as
the Coke advert demonstrates. Contagious laughter means ‘‘opening ourselves to the present
moment, the ﬂow and rhythm of laughter’’ (Macpherson, 2008: 1083). In this way, laughter
can be seen to enact modes of relational sociability between diﬀerent bodies, which in turn
generate ‘‘contagious subjectivities’’ (Lawtoo, 2011) ‘‘born’’ out of the aﬀections of laughter
itself (Nancy, 1993). Understanding laughter as transpersonal however also recognises its
relationality with other elements of the spaces in which it occurs:
Attending to the aﬀective transmissions between subjects means addressing ‘surges of emotion or
passion’ and their contagious qualities and how, for example, smells, sounds, chemicals, rhythms
and vibrations work to align people with others and against other others. (Closs Stephens,
2016: 185)
Because laughter operates through a mixture of material (perceptive) and aﬀective qualities,
that disperse across, and intersect with both space and bodies (human and nonhuman), we
might also think of laughter as aﬀectively atmospheric (Anderson, 2009) – a distributed, yet
palpable, quality of environmental immersion that is sensed by bodies but remains somewhat
ethereal (McCormack, 2008). Indeed, within everyday language, we might well describe the
tone or feel of laughter as atmospheric. The notion of atmosphere also enables a thinking
that aligns with Bataille (1986) and Nancy’s (1993) conceptions of laughter as pre-subjective
– atmospheres occurring ‘‘before and alongside the formation of subjectivity’’ (Anderson,
2009: 78). Each atmosphere thus forms a ‘‘singular’’ event within space (McCormack, 2013),
yet it is important to appreciate that atmospheres can, and will, be experienced diﬀerently by
diﬀerent bodies (Bissell, 2010), informed in part by historical processes of interaction
between bodies and spaces (Edensor, 2012).
This is an important recognition in moving away from some of the more universalising
tendencies within aﬀective thinking, which has been critiqued as verging on disembodied
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philosophical abstraction (Nayak, 2010; Tolia-Kelly, 2006). Feminist and postcolonial
scholars have thus called for more attention to be paid to bodily diﬀerence within
‘‘aﬀective geographies’’. Nayak (2010: 2371) argues that there is a need to understand
how ‘‘a constellation of feelings, practices, and imaginaries breathe life’’ into the ways
that diﬀerently situated bodies can aﬀect and be aﬀected. This is vital when thinking
about laughter, with already well documented eﬀects of culture, gender, race, and ability
on the ways that bodies laugh and are aﬀected by humour/laughter (Douglas, 2015;
Macpherson, 2008; Mbembe, 2001).
Overall, in thinking about laughter as more-than a representation of humour, I have
stressed the need to think about laughter as transpersonal and atmospheric, occurring
between subjects and as generating subjects themselves. Laughter is also, however, spatio-
temporally contingent, depending both on immediate and historical contexts. The question
arises therefore as to how we might approach laughter, given these contingencies and
therefore its indeterminacy. To paraphrase McCormack (2013: 7) how might we recognise
laughter as ‘‘stretching out across and between bodies’’, but also continuing to ‘‘involve
those same bodies and their ongoing spatiotemporal diﬀerentiation’’? In other words: how
does laughter organise already ‘‘existing’’ subjects, whilst simultaneously generating new
ones? Following McCormack therefore, the next section deploys the refrain, as a
conceptual tool, to deal with these questions.
Refrains of laughter
Everyday understandings of the refrain position it as a rhythmically repeated element of a
song or poem, that has lyrical or melodic consistency to it. As Gerlach (2015: 282) writes:
In music, the refrain is the talismanic referent point in a song or composition, a repetition to
which a tune is anchored, and often the cathartic moment of vibratory crescendo and resonance
in which all singers and instruments enjoin.
Following Deleuze and Guattari, however, the refrain takes on another, only partially
related, conception within nonrepresentational theories. As McCormack (2013) notes, a
refrain can be anything that adds structure to an otherwise chaotic world. Refrains may
appear at consistent rhythmic intervals, and be exactly repeated; yet they do not necessarily
have to be this way, sometimes occurring in slightly diﬀerent forms and at uneven intervals
(see Stewart, 2010).
This moves the refrain away from a purely musical term. Deleuze and Guattari (1994:
120) for instance describe refrains of colour, posture, and architecture. Slogans (Anderson,
2014; Closs Stephens, 2016); maps (Gerlach, 2015); sports commentary, dance and other
rhythmic movements (McCormack, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2013); and even the arguments of
human geography as a discipline (Gerlach and Jellis, 2015; McCormack, 2010, 2012);
have all been positioned by geographers as refrains capable of drawing together blocks of
space time, and marking out some consistency within an otherwise diﬀerentiating world
(McCormack, 2013).
Crucially, refrains are not simply aesthetic qualities but rather capture the (multiple) ways
in which ‘‘territories’’ are expressed: e.g. the ways in which diﬀerent animals use many
methods (sounds, smells, etc.) to mark their territories (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988).
Refrains should therefore not be thought of as predetermined functions but rather as
modes of ‘‘valence’’ that can draw and hold multiplicities together, but can also interrupt
the existing functionality of space times, ‘‘deterritorialising’’ them and ‘‘reterritorialising’’
them into diﬀerent forms, capable of doing diﬀerent things (Dewsbury, 2011).
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I contend therefore, that laughter can be understood as a refrain – something Deleuze and
Guattari (1986: 41–42) also allude to within their discussion of Kafka’s laughter. As the Coke
advert demonstrates, laughter can disrupt the feel of spaces, deterritorialising and
reterritorialising them towards diﬀerent modes of relation between bodies, thus generating
space times that have a diﬀerent atmospheric feel. Atmospheres and refrains are therefore
connected concepts (McCormack, 2013): the refrain providing a mechanism for explaining the
ways in which certain atmospheres are drawn together, and atmospheres in turn capturing some
sense of the territories that refrains produce. We can therefore understand laughter as a refrain
that draws out an atmospheric territory with a particular ‘‘felt’’ quality. This atmosphere can
perform deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation: inﬂecting bodies’ powers to act – either
increasing or decreasing them – and thus changing space itself (Duﬀ, 2016).
Again, these capacities have been noted in relation to humour. Bissel et al. (2012), for
instance, argue that an excess of aﬀect within humour generates atmospheres which soften
‘‘barriers’’ and thus increase the capacities of bodies to pay attention to disciplinary
messages (e.g. an airline safety demonstration). Similarly, Brigstocke (2014) describes the
ways in which humour in 20th-century Montmartre helped to develop a carnivalesque
atmosphere, thus enabling new modes of corporeal and aﬀective critique. The underlying
assumption in these analyses remains that humour and laughter are doing the same ‘‘work’’
and thus that examining humour allows insight into the power of laughter – the argument
that this article contests.
Positioning laughter as a refrain however, captures a sense of indeterminacy – aﬃrming
the idea of ‘‘sometimes’’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 312). Laughter-refrains sometimes
aﬀord bodies with increased capacities for action, through drawing them together
(Routledge, 2012), oﬀering (atmospheric) modes of critique (Bissell et al., 2012),
transforming corporeal experiences of space (Brigstocke, 2014); yet sometimes they reduce
capacities, through discipline (Douglas, 2015), ridicule (Billig, 2005), or exclusion (Kotthoﬀ,
2006). Indeed, sometimes, they do both, to diﬀerent bodies at the same time; or, sometimes
they do neither. The fundamental point is that because laughter-refrains operate between
bodies and pre-subjectively, their outcomes can be neither fully determined in advance, nor
always attributed to the intentionalities of laughers themselves (Hughes, 2016; Nancy, 1993).
In this way, laughter maintains the potential for what Williams (2016) describes as ‘‘nascent
creativity’’ – a capacity to create something new, out of the relations between corporeality,
materiality and aﬀectivity themselves rather than through cognitive agencies (recalling
Macpherson’s (2008) distinctions between humour and laughter).
As such, the refrain oﬀers a means through which we can grasp the multiplicity and the
indeterminacy of laughter, as well as its capacity to do things of its own accord. The leverage
of thinking in terms of laughter-refrains therefore, are in conceptualising moments of
laughter as (repeated) reference points around which bodies, experiences and space times
can acquire resonance (Gerlach, 2015). In other words, refrains capture laughter’s capacity
to do something, without necessarily determining what that something might be. Indeed, as
the next section demonstrates, what laughter-refrains actually do can sometimes be
something of a surprise – mobilising actions and aﬀections that have very diﬀerent
trajectories to those that humour theories might suggest.
Care home laughter
This section discusses laughter as a refrain through drawing on a series of events that
occurred during two periods of ethnographic research conducted as part of a larger
project that examine laughter within residential nursing homes for older people in the UK.
Emmerson 2087
The UK care sector is vast, with roughly 20,000 care homes (Oscar Research, 2016)
providing full time medical/social care for around 300,000 people over the age of 65
(Smith, 2016). There are several types of care home in terms of: ownership – private,
local authority, or volunteer run; funding for care – NHS (government funded),
privately funded, or private insurance funding; and type of care – nursing (with full
time medical nurse), or residential (Lievesley et al., 2011). There are also a number of
excellent studies that examine the geographies of institutions of care, for the most part
concentrating on themes of provision and access, power dynamics, mobilities of workers,
and emotional/aﬀective geographies of living and working within the care sector (e.g.
Andrews et al., 2005; Conradson, 2003; England, 2010; Milligan and Wiles, 2010;
Raghuram, 2012).
Most of the events described occurred within a nursing home located near to
Birmingham, UK, where I conducted a period of participant-observation between
September and December 2015, (voluntarily) working full-time alongside carers, nurses,
caterers, housekeepers and of course residents. McMorran (2012: 493) sets out the
advantages of researchers ‘‘becoming a body at work’’ in that it allows insights into the
‘‘unspoken aspects of work and work-places that are diﬃcult to address in interviews,
surveys and other methods that are removed from the workplace context and its
practices’’, but also in taking the body seriously, both as a key site for labour and as a
tool for research. Researching through the body is also a key mechanism for ‘‘witnessing’’
emotional and aﬀectual rhythms, ﬂuxes, and atmospheres (Dewsbury, 2003) and is thus
crucial for understanding laughter within care settings. Alongside the experiences within
this care home, I spent a ten-day period in January 2016 travelling with a professional
theatre company who were touring a pantomime version of ‘‘Beauty and The Beast’’
around care settings across the UK. Shows of this kind are common within the care
industry, usually ‘‘sold’’ as having medical and/or social beneﬁts for residents. This period
was again a ‘‘working’’ ethnography however I did not perform in any of the shows, instead
helping to erect and dismantle the stages and watching the actual shows from the audience.
As with all research in sensitive settings such as care homes, various ethical concerns arise.
In this research, many of the practical ethical issues were mediated through the ENRICH
(Enabling Research in Care Homes) network – a national organisation of which the care
home was a member. As such the home already had certain structures in place around
anonymity and consent, as well as safeguarding procedures for both researcher and
participants, into which a speciﬁc ethical review for this project was incorporated. The
homes I visited with the theatre group were contacted prior to my arrival and all gave
verbal consent for the research to take place. My position as a researcher remained open
to all staﬀ, residents, family members and other visitors, and indeed my role as a researcher
became the basis for many jokes both in the care home and with the theatre group. In writing
up the empirics in this article, I follow conventions used when writing up case studies around
elderly care. Workers are referred to by a single name whereas residents are referred to as
Mr/Mrs followed by a letter.3 For additional protection, both the names and letters used are
pseudonyms. Due to the less stringent ethical procedures, I include only minimal details
about the ‘‘theatre group home’’ and people within it.
The empirical elements presented below are categorised into three thematic sections. The
ﬁrst demonstrates the ways in which laughter-refrains are both transpersonal and
atmospheric and thus how they can generate a sense of collective subjectivity. The second
section describes a moment where the eﬀects of laughter diverge from the assumed eﬀects
of the humour that provokes it. The third section juxtaposes two similar moments to show
the indeterminacies within laughter-refrains, and how the ‘‘same’’ laughter can generate
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multiple aﬀections in diﬀerent bodies, depending on their situations (both present and
historical). As such, whilst there are elements of humour in all the examples laid out, the
emphasis rests on the advantages of maintaining analytic focus on laughter itself.
Laughter without humour
I am sitting in the dining room feeding breakfast to Mrs S with a number of other carers and
residents. The room is fairly calm and quiet so Laura decides to put some music on. She presses
the button, there is a click and a whirring of the CD in the drive. Suddenly, the calmness of the
room is shattered by an eruption from the speakers as ABBA’s ‘Dancing Queen’ blares out. At
this exact moment, Mary arrives, wheeling Mrs. F in front of her. Both of them are in ﬁts of
laughter, Mrs F rocking back and forth in her wheelchair and Mary half folded at the waist,
tears glinting in the corner of her eyes. They had been laughing all the way downstairs and as
they enter the dining room, their guﬀaws and giggles combine with the sound of Swedish Pop,
creating an excess of jovial energy that instantly ﬁlls the room. The whole room is suddenly in a
state of laughter. I can’t stop myself, it just comes from my belly and out of my mouth, a hearty
laugh that shakes my whole body. I look up at Nina – she catches my eye – her face creases up –
her laugh intensiﬁes. Then the same thing with Tara, then Mrs S, then Mrs H, Karen, and Laura.
The room, the walls and tables almost pulsate – a crescendo of laughter and music moving
around like a wave. I sit in the middle of it all shaking and gasping for air. Slowly over the next
few minutes the laughter fades back, my breathing returns to normal. The room itself remains
thick with a certain tension, and from time to time bursts of laughter punctures the air only to be
quickly stiﬂed by sharp intakes of breath . . .
- Field Diary, 20 October 2015
This encounter with laughter provides an overt example of laughter, rather than humour,
generating actions and aﬀections within bodies. There is no joke present. I found out later
that a perfume bottle had broken which meant Mrs F had been covered in perfume,
providing the initial catalyst for hers and Mary’s laughter, but this remained unknown at
the time.
Laughter thus forms a refrain here through which the expressive relations between bodies
can be redeﬁned, realigned, and reterritorialised. It draws out an atmospheric territory which
is physically and aﬀectively felt within and across diﬀerent bodies, causing them to crease,
fold, rock, shake, sway, and of course laugh. The laughter ﬁlls the space of the dining room
with waves and bursts of jovial energies of diﬀering intensities, forming a ‘‘unique totality
that incorporates individual bodies by subsuming them within an assemblage of forces’’
(Duﬀ, 2016: 64). Of these forces sonorous sensations are clearly central, yet they act
alongside other modes of bodily expression – the glancing and catching of eyes, and the
crumpling of faces – and constellations of music, food, smells of perfume, wheelchairs, and
other aﬀective intensities and memories (of the earlier calm and quietness for instance).
The laughter-refrain draws all of the bodies in the dining room into a new relational
assemblage characterised by common aﬀection (Edensor, 2012). We were no longer
individual bodies but instead, what Bataille and Nancy might call a community of
laughers (Parvulescu, 2010). The example shows how laughter can become the primary
way through which bodies relate to one another and space itself. It is important to
recognise however that laughter-refrains can also mobilise bodies in similar, yet smaller
and more subtle ways, generating aﬀections in just a few people within a larger set.
Sarah and Kate are hoisting Mrs P into her chair. All three are laughing about something (I’m
not sure what exactly). I am talking to Barbara and watching them out of the corner of my eye.
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Suddenly I let out a little laugh myself. Mrs P looks directly at me, ‘‘Why you laughing?’’ she
asks. I feel too rude to admit that it is just because they are . . .
- Field Diary, 12 November 2015
Here, the three women’s laughter draws me in, even though I am not involved in the joke.
Once again, we can start to see how laughter-refrains can move bodies in ways that are not
necessarily related to humour, through a contagious laughter. The spatialities of this
laughter-refrain displays atmospheric characteristics through its dispersal out across the
lounge and creation of aﬀective proximity between the group and myself, rhythmically
aligning my body with theirs, eliciting a moment of ‘‘shared’’ laughter (Edensor, 2012;
Macpherson, 2008). Yet what we also glimpse within this encounter is a sense of
indeterminacy within the laughter-refrain – the ways it aﬀects (or doesn’t) bodies
diﬀerently. Although there were several other people in the lounge, I seemed to be the
only one who was prompted to laugh. The reason for my ‘‘openness’’ here is probably
due to my positionality – my research focus making me more attuned to laughter and
thus more likely to be aﬀected by it – however the diﬀerences demonstrate a key element
in responding to critiques of the ‘‘universalising’’ tendencies of some aﬀective thinking
(Tolia-Kelly, 2006) through recognising the diﬀering capacities of bodies to be aﬀected by
atmospheres (Bissell, 2010) depending (in part at least) on their positions, situations or
orientations (Ahmed, 2006; Nayak, 2010).
Laughter beyond humour
Although never stated, care home entertainments, such as pantomime performances, are
arguably constituted by refrains. Usually based around artistic performance – such as music,
comedy, dance, magic, or mixtures of these – they are intended to enact sensations (both
perceptive and aﬀective) that deterritorialise the ‘‘ordinary’’ feel of care home spaces and
reterritorialise an atmosphere that feels more ‘‘enjoyable’’. Several indeterminacies exist that
aﬀect capacity of shows to do this however, particularly surrounding what Sharpe et al.
(2014) term the capacity of performers to ‘‘habituate’’ their audience. Within the shows that
I witnessed, many residents had dementia and therefore found it diﬃcult to engage with the
performances. Similarly, a reduced capacity to hear meant that several struggled to follow
the plot and thus maintain interest. Some residents did not necessarily wish to be present but
were often ‘‘forced’’ to watch shows, unable to leave due to needing mobility assistance.
Several times I overheard, or was told statements, such as ‘‘I hate pantomimes,’’ or ‘‘this is
not very good,’’ and in one case ‘‘I wish they hadn’t brought me in here’’ – again reducing
engagement from audiences and often meaning that shows struggled to provide their
intended outcomes.
The actors themselves, at times, would also struggle to engage with the performance,
often due to unresponsive audiences, but also because of the physical and mental fatigue
that performing and travelling for months at a time can cause:
The third show of the day is turning out to be slightly sluggish. We are in a care home for people
with dementia and mobility impairments. The cast look to be a little bored of each other and the
performance – probably tiredness from the two shows earlier today, the driving, and the months
of being on the road. The jokes from the start of the show have produced very few laughs – it
deﬁnitely feels like a care home rather than ‘the theatre’. ‘‘The Beast’’ enters the stage . . .He
looks slightly unkempt his shirt is supposed to be tucked in neatly but hangs down slightly from
the side and has become increasingly creased by being stuﬀed into a suitcase throughout the day.
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Suddenly a voice is audible towards the back of the room as one man turns to his neighbour and
says, loud enough for the whole room to hear, ‘‘what a scruﬀ!’’ For just a moment there is a
palpable tension in the room and then all of a sudden laughter erupts – residents, carers, actors,
and me – deep and uncontrollable. The cast can no longer carry on, corpsing every time they try
to get going again. When they do manage, there is a noticeable change, the audience seem to sit
up a little straighter, eyes more focussed on the performance and the next few jokes prompt a
much greater response. Together we are taken from a care home in Birmingham to a magical
world of Beauties, Beasts, talking candlesticks and clocks . . .
- Field Diary, 18 January 2016
This show was characterised by two diﬀerent qualities of ‘‘felt’’ experience: the ﬁrst, of
tiredness, subdued bodies, and slight disinterest; the second is more attentive, allowing for a
‘‘magical’’ and immersive atmosphere. The movement between the two sets of experience thus
marks a deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of bodies’ ways of being and becoming in
the care home – qualities suggestive of the show as a refrain. It is however, more speciﬁcally,
the laughter within the example above that serves to disrupt or interrupt the unfolding
experience (Brigstocke, 2014; Dawney, 2013). Laughter here, can also be thought of as a
refrain – a refrain within a refrain – that reterritorialises bodies around new matters of
aﬀective and corporeal expression that are distinctly atmospheric (Stewart, 2011).
Within this example, there is a clear joke present, yet in many ways it exempliﬁes the
argument set out in this paper: that there is an advantage to thinking ‘‘beyond the joke’’ even
if one is present. While it is possible to interpret this laughter in terms of humour theory,
particularly superiority – laughter as emerging from a ridiculing of the scruﬃness of ‘‘The
Beast’’ – there is a disjuncture between the theories of laughter and its actual workings.
Superiority theory is usually associated with feelings of power for laughers, over those who
are laughed at, yet in this instance the actions produced by this encounter with laughter seem
to demonstrate a bringing together of all the bodies (including ‘‘The Beast’’) rather than
separating them into diﬀerent parts. ‘‘Nonrepresentational humour theories’’ might oﬀer
another reading, suggesting that humour here mobilises a vitality within the space thus
generating ‘‘other’’ aﬀective experiences (including laughter) (Brigstocke, 2014). I would
suggest however that it is instead the event of laughter itself in this situation that mobilises
the shifts in atmosphere, in a similar manner to that of the previous section and that what is
actually at stake is here is laughter’s capacity to generate its own trajectories that exceed both
humour and the intentionalities of the jokers and laughers themselves (Hughes, 2016;
Williams, 2016).
Witnessing laughter
Within the laughter-refrains discussed thus far, my body has formed an active component –
always joining in with the act of laughing. While this was not an uncommon experience, there
were many more instances where I encountered laughter but did not laugh myself. Although
these occurred throughout the home, certain space times seemed more likely associated with
them, notably during personal-care tasks such as washing, dressing, and assisting residents
going to the toilet. These laughs exceed the spaces in which they occur, often audibly passing
through the care home’s doors, walls, ceiling, and ﬂoors, as the laughter extends ever
outwards. My ﬁeld notes describing these encounters are full of indicators of activity and
aﬀect – the sound of laughter as making me feel: ‘‘nice’’, ‘‘pleased’’, ‘‘less bored’’, ‘‘less lonely’’,
‘‘intrigued’’, ‘‘cheerier’’; or making me: ‘‘skip’’, ‘‘sing’’, ‘‘hum’’, or ‘‘smile’’ – which
demonstrate de/reterritorialisations as my body becomes enveloped by the aﬀective
sensations of laughter shared by others (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988; McCormack, 2013).
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Another locus for laughter in the home was around staﬀ breaks. Most breaks happened in
the dining room due to the staﬀ room being around ﬁve minutes’ walk from the main
working areas and so going there was seen to ‘‘eat into’’ the break itself. A certain
ﬂexibility in the ways that the space of the dining room is engaged at diﬀerent times is
therefore necessary. Laughter-refrains are important in this, enacting a deterritorialisation
of the room as a work space and a reterritorialisation of it as a break space with diﬀerent
emotional and aﬀective practices and attachments.
I walk into the dining room where some carers are sat at a table having a break. ‘‘Join us!’’
they call over to me, and for the ﬁrst time in the three weeks I have been here I get to sit
down and have an ‘oﬃcial’ break. Today has been running smoothly, everyone is in a good
mood. The carers sit chatting to each other and eating a plate of biscuits. It is nice, they are
‘bantering’ and making fun of each other a little while they talk about stuﬀ that is going on at
home. Moments of laughter pepper the conversation, short intense bursts at relatively consistent
intervals which start to blend into one another. Each one seems to relax the muscles in my back
and sooth my feet a little. I smile, remaining silent, bathing in the laughter rather than joining in
myself . . .
- Field Diary, 29 October 2015
The atmosphere is again clear within this moment – I can ‘‘bathe’’ in it; it aﬀects my body –
physically relaxing my muscles and creating feelings of enjoyment, rest, inclusion. Laughter,
although not the only element of this atmosphere, marks the refrain around which it
territorialised. On my preliminary visit to the home, one carer told me ‘‘we do laugh a lot
here, especially over a brew [cup of tea]’’. The ‘‘causes’’ of this laughter are varied: ‘‘banter’’,
joking, story-telling, watching videos together on YouTube. Yet, regardless of their cause,
many of the breaks I was involved in share a similar aﬀective imprint, feelings which mark
those space times out as breaks rather than work. These atmospheres of laughter can again
be seen a refrain through which the space of the dining room can be creatively transformed
and repurposed, and within which bodies can do diﬀerent things, perform diﬀerent actions,
aﬀect and be aﬀected in diﬀerent ways.
As noted above however, laughter is never bound within a particular space – overﬂowing
individual rooms meaning people will experience it from diﬀerent locations, positions, and
situations: ‘‘we may walk into a room and ‘feel the atmosphere’, but what we may feel
depends on the angle of our arrival’’ (Ahmed, 2008: 125). To demonstrate this, I
juxtapose this ﬁrst encounter with a staﬀ break with a diﬀerent one. The laughter events
themselves are very similar, but experienced from diﬀerent locations, and thus produce
palpably diﬀerent aﬀective experiences.
I am sitting in the little lounge talking quietly with Mr H. Three of the carers are on break at a
table just inside the dining room, the murmur of their conversation buzzing away in the
background. I can’t see them but an open archway connects the two rooms and Mr H can
just about see them from where he is sat. Suddenly a cackle of laughter erupts from their table,
reverberating through the archway and into the lounge. Mr H’s face lights up, the corner of his
mouth creeping upwards and his eyes widening. He turns towards them join in, shouting ‘‘what’s
that?’’ One of the carer’s faces appears in the archway as she rocks her chair backwards. Without
noting what he said, she automatically replies ‘‘we are on break [Mr H], we will come in ﬁve
minutes’’ and she swung forwards again, seeming to think nothing of it. A second or two passes,
the murmuring continues, and then again, a second wave of laughter washes outwards from
them and into the room. His face falls again, seeming to grey, I feel his pain, his isolation, his
rejection. My body tenses, he obviously no longer wants to chat . . .
- Field Diary, 5 December 2015
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Both encounters with breaks can be seen as ‘‘arrivals’’ (Ahmed, 2008). The ﬁrst is a literal
arrival as I enter a room, the second emerges as laughter spills-over into an adjacent room.
Clearly each of these events aﬀect bodies in diﬀerent ways – I am easily incorporated into the
ﬁrst; Mr H is rejected and thus restricted by the second. We must therefore recognise the
contingent nature of the various material/aﬀective forces that compose laughter-refrains,
and particularly the ways in which the arrival of a new body requires a creative ‘‘re-
composition’’ – either to destroy or incorporate that body’s forces (Deleuze and Guattari,
1988). The second encounter also demonstrates the ﬂeeting nature of these compositions and
the way that they can enact multiple ‘‘trajectories’’ that produce diﬀerent aﬀective responses
and relational experiences, at diﬀerent times. Initially Mr H experiences a positive aﬀection –
his face lights up, he turns to them, he is feeling positive, included, wants to join in – yet he is
rejected and therefore the second burst of laughter produces a negative aﬀection – his face
drops, there is exclusion, isolation, his actions become limited, and he no longer wants to
talk to me. This reiterates the point that atmospheric laughter-refrains are not homogenous
entities but are rather a multiplicity of material and aﬀective qualities, trajectories and
intensities, capable of shifting and thus aﬀecting bodies diﬀerently at diﬀerent times
(Edensor, 2015).
It is therefore imperative to recognise the importance of bodily, and thus spatial,
diﬀerences. In the ﬁrst encounter, I am incorporated into the atmosphere of laughter, in
part because I can enter the space of the table without physical assistance – distinguishing me
from most residents. I am also identiﬁed as ‘‘worker’’ and thus seen as entitled to a break, a
chance to rest my body and mind in the same way as ‘‘regular’’ workers. Mr H does not have
the same potential. Not only is he physically unable to move into the room and thus must
shout to try and join in, but as a resident his body is layered with meaning (both
representational and nonrepresentational) that designate him as ‘‘work,’’ and thus beyond
the realms of what constitutes a break space. We can start to see how laughter-refrains are
not only enacted within the bounds of the spaces in which they occur but also the ways in
which they, alongside a myriad of social, material, and discursive resources (Duﬀ, 2010), can
produce space itself – although a space that might not feel the same for everyone within it.
Discussion: From ethics to ‘‘ethos’’
Attending to and through aﬀect points to the importance of cultivating an ethical sensibility
responsive as much to the transformative potential of the event as to the subject and object of
ethics. (McCormack, 2003: 500)
All the examples discussed above demonstrate laughter as imbued with productive or
creative force (Williams, 2016) which interacts with other forces (material, social,
aﬀective) to produce particular power relations. These power relations in turn have the
capacity to transform the structure and feel of space – producing atmospheres that are
‘‘jovial’’ (during the breakfast), ‘‘magical’’ (during the pantomime), ‘‘relaxing’’ (during the
ﬁrst break), or ‘‘tense’’ and ‘‘alienating’’ (during the second); as well as the relations of
bodies within it – their capacities for action and aﬀection. As such, each laughter-refrain
forms an event with particular ethical implications in terms of its ability to expand or restrict
what bodies can do within space (Braidotti, 2011) which are contextualised in part, by the
geographies within which they occur.
As noted above, this approach has already been applied in order to analyse humour as an
event (Bissell et al., 2012; Brigstocke, 2014; Hynes and Sharpe, 2010; Sharpe et al., 2014),
sometimes also seeming to depict what is happening during events of laughter. Yet as the
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examples above demonstrate laughter itself can enact trajectories that exceed humorous
intentionality and therefore prompt diﬀerent outcomes to those suggested by humour
theories. As such there is a clear need to think beyond humour in order to attend to
laughter itself (even when humour is present).
Thinking of laughter in terms of atmospheres and refrains provides a vehicle through
which to do this. The refrain in particular renders laughter as indeterminate, contingent and
multiple: sometimes laughter produces outcomes in ways that might be expected; yet at
others, it seems to produce something ‘‘unexpected’’ and new (Williams, 2016). Within the
pantomime event for example, we see a moment of ‘‘superiority’’ humour, yet, in contrast, a
laughter that disrupts assumed power geometries, ﬂowing from laugher to laughed-at
(Douglas, 2015), seeming to unite bodies, rather than separating them. Similarly,
moments where laughter is encountered by bodies together, are often depicted as aﬀecting
bodies with ‘‘joy’’, increasing their capacities for action and aﬀection (Brigstocke, 2014;
Hynes et al., 2007; Macpherson, 2008; Routledge, 2012) which we see within the staﬀ
break that I am directly involved in. Yet the juxtaposition with the other break, which is
anchored around a similar laughter-refrain, demonstrates that the ‘‘same’’ laughter can
sometimes also be restricting of these same capacities. Overall, this sense of indeterminacy
means that attempting to develop an understanding of laughter’s power based on codiﬁed
rules, which might dictate its ‘‘appropriateness’’ in certain spaces and times, seems somewhat
unsatisfactory – especially an understanding that relies analytically on humour.
As such there is a clear need to cultivate a further level of precision in understanding the
transformative potential of the ‘‘event of laughter’’ (whether situated within humour or not)
in order to attend to the ethics of laughter itself, in both spatial and corporeal terms. Popke
(2009) notes that nonrepresentational theories oﬀer new opportunities for thinking of ethics,
not as a set of moral principles, but rather as an ‘‘ethos’’ (also Popke, 2006), through which
we might oﬀer a more generous conception of what constitutes good or bad encounters (see
also Darling, 2010). I would therefore argue that, given its indeterminacy, we must cultivate
an ‘‘ethos’’ for laughter that is attuned to an ontology of the in-between (Bille et al., 2015;
Duﬀ, 2016), a sense of the unknown (Bataille and Michelson, 1986) and the ‘‘surprise of life’’
(Anderson, 2014) – through which we can recognise laughter as able to create its own
trajectories, contexts and subjectivities, at both individual and collective registers
(Lawtoo, 2011; Nancy, 1993). In this way, we can be more precise in our ethical
assessments of the singularity of events of laughter (McCormack, 2003), whilst accounting
for the diﬀerent powers, forces, bodies, scales and orientations, that make each singular
event always also plural (Nancy, 2000).
Conclusion
A simple movement can change everything. The movement of thought away from humour,
for example, shifts the ways in which we can describe, discuss, and understand laughter. The
‘‘meaning of laughter’’ is rendered meaningless because, as we have seen, laughter is always
in excess of itself (Anderson, 2014; Bataille and Michelson, 1986), always expressing more-
than its representations, always indeterminate and unﬁnished (Gerlach, 2015). Events of
laughter themselves also emerge from simple movements, which implicate the geographies
of the body: the locations of ‘‘its’’ subjectivities, ‘‘its’’ consciousness, and ‘‘its’’ emotions; but
also, the ways in which it becomes orientated in relation to spaces, places, and other bodies.
This article has thus oﬀered a critique of the ways in which research around laughter is
mostly theorised in terms of humour, and suggested ameans throughwhich wemight ‘‘return’’
to thinking about laughter itself (Parvulescu, 2010). In doing this, I have utilised atmospheres
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and refrains as concepts that can articulate laughter – as a transpersonal, material and
aﬀective force, around which relationalities between bodies come into being and thus space
times are produced (McCormack, 2013). I have highlighted the indeterminacies or
uncertainties within these processes, that emerge from laughter’s capacity to produce its
own trajectories in ways that exceed humour and the intentionalities of laughers themselves
(Hughes, 2016). In some ways, my push to think laughter beyond humour, evokes Bataille’s
argument: that laughter is as closely linked to experiences of death, sex or religious experience,
as it is to humour.4 My intention has been however, to not to go quite that far – instead
accepting a close relation between humour and laughter, although adamantly aﬃrming that
humour and laughter are not the same phenomenon.
In making this argument, I have therefore described a series of events of laughter within
nursing care homes that demonstrate some of these potentials, showing how laughter-
refrains can enact de/reterritorialisations (capable of drawing bodies together and
pushing them apart) in ways that interrupt the actual and assumed/imagined power
geometries generated by humour and its theories, and which implicate bodily diﬀerence
within them. Laughter can be thought of not simply as a choice of happiness (as the Coca-
Cola advert suggests) but instead as imbued with a much more complex set of ethical
sensibilities. I have therefore argued for a more precise analysis of laughter: both in
attending to the transformative potential of laughter itself, not just the humorous
moments that precede it; and in thinking about the indeterminate ethics of more-than
just those who are laughing, through considering the many diﬀerent bodies who may be
witnessing the laughter also.
Ultimately, all of this may seem like a minor shift in thinking, yet the context of the
empirical examples points towards its potential magnitude. Often when thinking about
laughter in care settings, scholarship has searched for its functions or purposes (e.g. Adams
and Mcguire, 1986; Leiber, 1986; Mallett, 1995; Mora-Ripoll, 2010), usually to promote its
use as a social or therapeutic tool, mostly declaring laughter to be a universal good. These
studies again either analyse in terms of humour, or through measuring cognitive patterns of
people who are laughing. As such, I would argue, in line with other nonrepresentational
scholarship around therapeutic atmospheres (Duﬀ, 2016; Gorman, 2016; McCormack,
2003; Williams, 2002) that there is a need here to think more fully about the multiplicities
within the singularity of each event (of laughter) (Nancy, 2000): about the totality of the
assemblages it is de/reterritorialises, and thus about the diﬀerent directions it is
encountered from (including ones that might not be being ‘‘measured’’). In doing this, we
might discover that laughter, even if encountered from just around the corner, often has
ethical potentials that are very diﬀerent and more complex than those which initially appear.
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Notes
1. I am grateful to Naeemah Yusof for bringing this to my attention. The full video is available to view
on YouTube: www.youtube.com/watch?v¼1veWbLpGa78
2. Brigstocke (2014) offers a list of other philosophers who also note this quality in laughter.
3. See: www.ombudsman.org.uk/care-and-compassion/case-studies/
4. As one reviewer rightly pointed out.
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